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decisions should be based on objective quantitative measures of disclosure risk and data utility. This 
paper reviews recent developments in disclosure risk assessment and discusses how these can be 
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We illustrate the Disclosure risk-Data Utility approach based on samples drawn from a Census where 
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1.  Introduction 
Statistical Agencies release sample microdata from social surveys under different modes of access 
ranging from Public Use Files (PUF)  in the form of tables or highly perturbed datasets to Microdata 
Under Contract (MUC) for researchers and licensed institutions where levels of  protection  are less 
severe. In addition, Statistical Agencies often have on-site datalabs where registered researchers can 
access unperturbed statistical data. Statistical Agencies will generally set up a panel of experts to form 
a Microdata Review Panel (MRP) who will then have the authority  to release microdata. To make 
informed decisions about the release of microdata, the MRP  needs  objective disclosure risk measures  
to determine tolerable risk thresholds according to the access mode. They also need to  monitor the 
application of data masking techniques and to ensure the quality  and utility of the released microdata. 
  
This paper provides a review of some recent developments in disclosure risk assessment and discusses 
how these may be integrated with established methods of data masking and some recent methods of 
utility assessment. It is only through a  holistic approach of a disclosure risk-data utility assessment 
that microdata can safely be released while ensuring  high quality and utility in the data.   
 
In any released microdata set direct identifying key variables, such as name, address or identification 
numbers, are removed. Disclosure risk typically arises from attribute disclosure where small counts on 
cross-classified indirectly identifying key variables (such as: age, sex, place of residence, marital status, 
occupation, etc.) can be used to identify an individual and confidential information may be learnt. 
Generally, identifying key variables are categorical. Sensitive variables are often continuous, but can 
also be categorical. In order to protect a data set, one can either apply a Statistical Disclosure 
Limitation (SDL) method on the identifying key variables or the sensitive variables. In the first case 
identification of a unit is rendered more difficult, and the probability that a unit is identified is hence 
reduced. In the second case, even if an  ‘intruder’ succeeds in identifying a unit by using the values of 
the  identifying key variables, the sensitive variables would hardly disclose any useful information on 
the particular record. One can also apply SDL techniques on both the identifying  and  sensitive 
variables simultaneously. This offers more protection, but also leads to more information loss. 
Based on the literature, methods for assessing disclosure risk for sample microdata arising from social 
surveys  can be classified into three types: 
 
•  Heuristics that identify special uniques on a set of cross-classified key variables, i.e. sample 
uniques that are likely to be population uniques (see, Skinner and Elliot, 2002 and Elliot, et al., 
2005 and  references therein),  
  1•  Probabilistic record linkage on  a set of key (matching) variables that can be used to link the  
microdata  to an external population  file (see Yancey, Winkler, and Creecy, 2002, Domingo-
Ferrer and Torra, 2003 and references therein), 
•  Probabilistic modeling of disclosure risk  which was developed under two approaches:  a full 
model-based framework taking into account all of the information available to ‘intruders’ and 
modeling their behavior (see   Duncan and Lambert, 1989, Lambert 1993 and later Reiter, 2005 
and references therein), and a more  simplified approach that restricts the information that would 
be known to ‘intruders’ (see Bethlehem, Keller and Pannekoek, 1990, Benedetti, Capobianchi and 
Franconi, 1998,  Fienberg and Makov, 1998, Skinner and Holmes, 1998, Elamir and Skinner, 2006 
and references therein).  
 
Heuristics and record linkage suffer from the drawback that there is no framework for obtaining 
consistent record-level and global-level disclosure risk measures. Record-level disclosure risk measures 
can be used to target high-risk records in the microdata for SDL methods. Global disclosure risk 
measures are aggregated from record-level risk measures and are essential for MRPs to inform 
decisions when releasing microdata. In addition, these types, as well as the full model-based 
probabilistic approach,  do not take into account the protection afforded by the sampling. In Section 2, 
we review the simplified probabilistic modeling approach to disclosure risk assessment as the optimal 
approach. It provides consistent global and record-level disclosure risk measures, takes into account the 
sampling mechanism and is simple to implement. Skinner and Shlomo (2007) have further developed 
this approach to take into account the realistic case where key variables may be misclassified or   
purposely perturbed as an SDL method.  
 
Based on the disclosure risk assessment, Statistical Agencies must choose appropriate SDL methods 
either by perturbing, modifying, or summarizing the data. The choice depends on the access mode, 
requirements of the users and the impact on quality and information loss. Choosing an optimal SDL 
method is an iterative process where a balance must be found between managing disclosure risk and 
preserving the utility in the microdata.  
 
SDL methods for microdata include perturbative methods that alter the data and non-perturbative 
methods which limit the amount of information released. Examples of non-perturbative SDL methods 
that are often applied  at Statistical Agencies are  global recoding and suppression of values or whole  
key variables. Sub-sampling records is also a non-perturbative method and is often used for producing 
Census microdata. Perturbative methods for masking continuous sensitive variables include: adding 
random noise (see Kim, 1986, Fuller, 1993, Brand, 2002, Yancey, Winkler and Creecy, 2002); micro-
aggregation where records are grouped and their values replaced by their average (Defays and 
Nanopoulos, 1992, Anwar 1993, Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz, 2002); rounding to a pre-selected 
rounding base; and rank swapping  where values between pairs of record within a small group are 
swapped (Dalenius and Reiss, 1982, Fienberg and McIntyre, 2005). Perturbative methods for 
categorical key variables include record swapping (typically swapping geography variables) and a 
more general post-randomization probability mechanism (PRAM) where categories of variables are 
changed or not changed according to a prescribed probability matrix and a stochastic selection process 
(Gouweleeuw,   et al. 1998). For more information on perturbative and non-perturbative methods  see 
also: Willenborg and De Waal, 2001, Domingo-Ferrer, Mateo-Sanz, and Torra, 2001, and references 
therein. 
 
Each SDL method impacts differently on the level of protection obtained in the microdata and   
information loss. Oganian and Karr (2006) discuss combining SDL methods in order to obtain more 
effective protection in the microdata. Shlomo and De Waal (2008) discuss optimizing SDL methods to 
preserve sufficient statistics as well as the logical consistencies in the microdata. In Section 3, we 
provide a review of some standard SDL methods for microdata which can be adapted to increase the 
utility in the data under the same levels of protection.   
Information loss measures have been developed in Domingo-Ferrer, Mateo-Sanz and  Torra, 2001, 
Gomatam and Karr, 2003 and Karr, et al., 2006, Shlomo and Young, 2006 and Shlomo, 2007. In 
Section 4, we review some useful  information loss measures that quantify the effects of SDL methods 
on  statistical analysis.  
In Section 5, we illustrate the Disclosure Risk-Data Utility assessment on samples drawn from a 
Census  where the population is known and can be used to investigate sample-based inference and 
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assessment of microdata with respect to managing disclosure risk while ensuring high quality data to 
users. Section 6 concludes with a discussion.  
 
 
2.  Disclosure Risk Assessment 
Identifying key variables for disclosure risk assessment are determined by a disclosure risk scenario, 
i.e. assumptions about available external files and IT tools that can be used by ‘intruders’ to identify 
individuals in released microdata. For example, key variables may be chosen which would enable 
matching the released microdata to a publicly available file containing names and addresses. Under a 
probabilistic approach, disclosure risk is assessed on the contingency table of counts spanned by these 
identifying key variables. The other variables in the file are sensitive variables. The assumption is that 
the  microdata contain individuals investigated in a survey and the population is unknown (or only 
partially known through some marginal distributions). The disclosure risk is a function of both the 
population and the sample, and in particular the cell counts of a contingency table defined by 
combinations of identifying discrete key variables, i.e. place of residence, sex, age, occupation, etc. 
 
Individual per-record risk measures in the form of a probability of re-identification are estimated. 
These  per-record risk measures are then aggregated to obtain global risk measures for the entire file. 
Denoting     the population size in cell   of a table spanned by key variables having K cells and  
 the sample size and   and   .  The set of sample uniques, is defined: 
 since these are potential high-risk records, i.e. population uniques. Two global 
disclosure risk measures (where I is the indicator function) are the following:  
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The individual risk measure for  2 τ  is . This is the probability that a match between a record in 
the microdata and a record in the population having the same values of key variables will be correct. If 
for example, there are two records in the population with the same values of key variables, the 
probability is 0.5 that the match will be correct. Adding up these probabilities over the sample uniques 
gives the expected number (on average) of correctly matching a record in the microdata to the 
population when we allow guessing. The population frequencies   are unknown and  need to be  
estimated from the  probabilistic model the risk measures by:  
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Skinner and Holmes (1998) and Elamir and Skinner (2006) propose  a Poisson Model to estimate 
disclosure risk measures. In this model, they assume the natural assumption in contingency table 
literature:   ) ( ~ k k Poisson F λ  for each cell k. A sample is drawn by Poisson or Bernoulli sampling 
with a sampling fraction  k π  in cell k:  ) , ( ~ | k k k k F Bin F f π . It follows that:  
            ) ( ~ k k k Pois f λ π  and   )) 1 ( ( ~ | k k k k Poisson f F π λ −                                              (2) 
where   are conditionally independent.   k k f F |
 
The parameters  } { k λ are estimated using log-linear modeling. The sample frequencies     are 
independent Poisson distributed with a mean of  
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k k k λ π μ = . A log-linear model for the  k μ  is  
expressed as:   β μ k k x′ = ) log(  where   is a design vector which denotes the main effects and 
interactions of the  model for the key variables. The maximum likelihood (MLE) estimator
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risk measures. 
 
Skinner and Shlomo (2008) develop a method for selecting the log-linear model based on estimating 
and (approximately) minimizing the bias  of the risk estimates  1 ˆ τ  and  2 ˆ τ . Defining 
) 1 | 1 ( ) ( = = = k k k f F P h λ  for  1 τ  and  ) 1 | / 1 ( ) ( = = k k k f F E h λ  for  2 τ , they consider the 
expression:                                                                                  ∑ − = =
k
k k k h h f I E B )] ( ) ˆ ( )][ 1 ( [ λ λ
A Taylor expansion of h leads to the approximation  
      ] 2 / ) ˆ )( ( ' ' ) ˆ )( ( ' )[ exp(
2
k k k k k k k k k k h h B λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ π − + − − ≈∑
and the relations   k k k Ef λ π =  and   under the 
hypothesis of a Poisson fit lead to a further approximation of 
2 2 2 ) ˆ ( ] ) ˆ [( k k k k k k k E f f E λ λ π λ π − = − −
B of the form 
     (5)  )] 2 /( ] ) ˆ )[( ˆ ( ' ' ) ˆ )( ˆ ( ' )[ ˆ exp( ˆ ˆ 2
k k k k k k k k k k k k k k f f h f h B π λ π λ λ π λ λ π λ − − + − − − ≈∑
For example, for  1 τ  they obtain:  
     (6)  )]} 2 /( ] ) ˆ )[( 1 ( ) ˆ ){( 1 )( ˆ exp( ˆ ˆ 2
1 k k k k k k k k k k k k k f f f B π λ π π λ π π λ λ − − − + − − − ≈∑
The method selects the model using a forward search algorithm which minimizes the standardized bias 
estimate  i i v B ˆ / ˆ  for   2 , 1 , ˆ = i i τ   where  i ν ˆ  are variance estimates of  .   i B ˆ
 
Skinner and Shlomo (2008) address the estimation of disclosure risk measures under complex survey 
designs with stratification, clustering and survey weights. While the method described assumes that all 
individuals within cell k are selected independently using Bernoulli sampling, i.e.   
, this may not be the case when sampling clusters (households). In 
practice, key variables typically include variables such as age, sex and occupation, that tend to cut 
across clusters. Therefore the above assumption holds in practice in most household surveys and does 
not cause bias in the estimation of the risk measures. Inclusion probabilities may vary across strata, the 
most common stratification is on geography. Strata indicators should always be included in the key 
variables to take into account differential inclusion probabilities in the model. Under complex 
sampling, the 
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The resulting estimates are plugged into   expressions in (4)  and  } ˆ { k λ k π   is   replaced by the estimate 
ˆ ˆ / kk k f F π = . Note that the risk measures in (4) only depend on sample uniques and the value of  ˆk π  
in this case is simply the reciprocal of the survey weight. The test criteria  ˆ B  is also adapted to the 
pseudo-maximum likelihood method.  
 
The probabilistic model presented as well as other  probabilistic methods (see Bethlehem,  Keller, and 
Pannekoek, 1990,  Benedetti,  Capobianchi, and Franconi, 1998, Rinott and Shlomo 2006, 2007a) 
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capture, key variables can also purposely be misclassified as a means of masking the data, for example  
through record swapping or PRAM. Skinner and Shlomo (2007) adapt the estimation of risk measures 
to take into account measurement errors.  Denoting the cross-classified key variables in the population 
and the microdata as X and assuming that  X in the microdata have undergone some misclassification or 
perturbation error denoted by the value  X %  and determined independently by a misclassification matrix  
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Under assumptions of small sampling fractions and small misclassification errors, the measure can be 
approximated by:    or   ∑
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Aggregating the per-record disclosure risk measures, the global risk measure is:   
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Note that to calculate the measure only the diagonal of the misclassification matrix needs to be known, 
i.e. the probabilities of not being perturbed. Population counts are generally not known so the estimate 
in (10) can be obtained by probabilistic modeling on the misclassified sample: 
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3.  Statistical Disclosure Limitation Methods for Sample Microdata 
Depending on the outcome of the disclosure risk measures, the risk thresholds set by MRPs and the 
mode of access, SDL methods may need to be applied. The standard procedures when releasing 
microdata are to recode and collapse the  identifying categorical key variables in order to reduce the 
risk of identification. This is a non-perturbative method which limits the amount of information 
released. Categorical key variables can also be protected using a perturbative method, such as record 
swapping or more generally the post-randomization method (PRAM ) (see Gouweleeuw, et al., 1998). 
As a perturbative method, PRAM  alters the data, and therefore we can expect consistent records to 
start failing edit rules. Edit rules  describe either logical relationships that have to hold true, such as “a 
two-year old person cannot be married” or “the profit and the costs of an enterprise should sum up to 
its turnover”, or relationships that have to hold true in most cases, such as “a 12-year old girl cannot be 
a mother”. 
Willenborg and De Waal (2001) describe the process of applying PRAM as follows: Let   be a   
transition matrix containing conditional probabilities 
 for a categorical variable with   
categories,   the vector of frequencies and   the vector of relative frequencies: 
P L L×
)   is category    original |   is category    perturbed ( i j p pij = L
t v n t v =  , where n is 
the number of records in the micro-data set. In each record of the data set, the category of the variable 
is changed or not changed according to the prescribed transition probabilities in the matrix   and the 
result of a draw of a random multinomial variate u with parameters pij (j=1,…,L). If the j-th category is 
selected, category i is moved to category j. When i = j, no change occurs. Let   be the vector of the 
perturbed frequencies.   is a random variable and  . Assuming that the transition 
probability matrix   has an inverse  , this can be used to obtain an unbiased moment estimator of 
the original data:  . In order to ensure that the transition probability matrix has an inverse and 
to control the amount of perturbation, the matrix   is chosen to be dominant on the main diagonal, i.e. 
each entry on the main diagonal is over 0.5.  
P
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  5The condition of invariance can be placed on the transition matrix  , i.e.  P t tP = . This releases the 
users of the perturbed file of the extra effort to obtain unbiased moment estimates of the original data, 
since   itself will be an unbiased estimate of  . To obtain an invariant transition matrix, a   matrix Q  
is calculated by transposing matrix  , multiplying each column 
* t t
P j by   and then normalizing its 
rows so that the sum of each row equals one. The invariant matrix is obtained by
j v
PQ R = . The 
invariant matrix R  may distort the desired probabilities on the diagonal, so Shlomo and De Waal 
(2008) define a parameter α  and calculate   where   is the identity matrix.  I R R ) 1 (
* α α − + = I
* R  
will also be invariant and the amount of perturbation is controlled by the value of α . The property of 
invariance means that the expected values of the marginal distribution of the variable being perturbed 
are preserved. In order to obtain the exact marginal distribution and reduce the additional variance 
caused by the perturbation, a “without” replacement selection strategy for  choosing  values to perturb 
can be implemented based on the expectations calculated from the transition probabilities. This method 
was used to perturb the Sample of Anonymized Records (SARs) of the 2001 UK Census (Gross, 
Guiblin and Merrett, 2004).  
 
As in most perturbative SDL methods, joint distributions between perturbed and unperturbed variables 
are distorted, in particular for variables that are highly correlated with each other. The perturbation can 
be controlled as follows:   
1.  Before applying PRAM, the variable to be perturbed is divided into subgroups,  G . The 
transition (and invariant) probability matrix is developed for each subgroup g,  g R . The transition 
matrices for each subgroup are placed on the main diagonal of the overall final transition matrix 
where the off diagonal probabilities are all zero, i.e. the variable is only perturbed within the 
subgroup and the difference in the variable between the original value and the perturbed value will 
not exceed a specified level. An example of this is perturbing age within broad age bands.  
g ,..., 1 =
2.  The variable to be perturbed may be highly correlated with other variables. Those variables should 
be compounded into one single variable. PRAM should be carried out on the compounded variable. 
Alternatively, the variable to be perturbed is carried out within subgroups defined by the second 
highly correlated variable. An example of this is when age is perturbed within groupings defined 
by marital status.  
 
The control variables in the perturbation process will minimize the amount of edit failures, but they 
will not eliminate all edit failures, especially edit failures that are out of scope of the variables that are 
being perturbed. Remaining edit failures need to be manually or automatically corrected through edit 
and imputation processes depending on the amount and  types of edit failures.  
In addition to the categorical key variables, sensitive continuous  variables can also be perturbed so that  
even if an identification is made based on the key variables, the information is protected from the 
‘intruder’.  The following are some common perturbative methods for masking sensitive continuous 
variables that have been adapted to preserve sufficient statistics and logical consistencies in the 
microdata:  
 
3.1    Additive noise  
In its basic form, random noise is generated independently and identically distributed with a positive 
variance and a mean of zero. The random noise is then added to the original variable (see Brand 2002 
and references therein for a summary and discussion of additive random noise). Adding random noise 
will not change the mean of the variable for large datasets but will introduce more variance. This will 
impact on the ability to make statistical inferences. Researchers may have suitable methodology to 
correct for this type of measurement error but it is good practice to minimize these errors through better 
implementation of the method.  
 
Additive noise should be generated within small  homogenous sub-groups (for example, percentiles of 
the continuous variable) in order to use different initiating perturbation variance for each sub-group. 
Generating noise in sub-groups also causes less edit failures with respect to relationships in the data. 
Following Kim (1986) and Fuller (1993), correlated random noise can be added to the continuous 
variable thereby ensuring that not only means are preserved but also the exact variance. A simple 
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De Waal (2008) is as follows:  
 
Procedure 1 (univariate): Define a parameter δ  which takes a value greater than 0 and less than 
equal to 1. When  1 = δ  we obtain the case of fully modeled synthetic data. The parameter δ controls 
the amount of random noise added to the variable z. After selecting a δ , calculate:  ) 1 (
2
1 δ − = d  
and 
2
2 δ = d . Now, generate random noise ε  independently for each record with a mean of 
μ μ
2
1 1
d
d −
= ′  and the original variance of the variable  . Typically, a Normal Distribution  is used 
to generate the random noise. Calculate the perturbed variable 
2 σ
i z′  for each record i in the sample 
microdata  (i=1,..,n) as a linear combination:  i i i d z d z ε × + × = ′ 2 1 . Note that 
) ( )] (
1
[ ) ( ) (
2
1
2 1 z E z E
d
d
d z E d z E =
−
+ = ′  and  
) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
2 2 z Var z Var z Var z Var = + − = ′ δ δ  since the random noise is generated 
independently to the original variable z. 
 
An additional problem when adding random noise is that there may be several variables to perturb at 
once, and these variables may be connected through an edit constraint of additivity. One procedure to 
preserve additivity would be to perturb two of the variables and obtain the third from aggregating the 
perturbed variables. However, this method will not preserve the total, mean and variance of the 
aggregated variable and in general, it is not good practice to compound effects of perturbation by 
aggregating perturbed variables since this causes unnecessary information loss.  
 
Shlomo and De Waal, 2008  propose  implementing Procedure 1 in a multivariate setting where   
correlated Gaussian noise is added to the variables simultaneously. The method not only preserves the 
means of each of the three variables and their co-variance matrix, but also preserves the edit constraint 
of additivity.  
 
Procedure 1 (multivariate): Consider three variables  y x,  and   where z z y x = + . This procedure 
generates random noise that a priori preserves additivity and therefore combining the random noise to 
the original variables will also ensure additivity. In addition, means and the covariance structure are 
preserved. The technique is as follows: 
Generate multivariate random noise:  , where the superscript T denotes the 
transpose. In order to preserve sub-totals and limit the amount of noise, the random noise should be 
generated within percentiles (note that we drop the index for percentiles). The vector   contains the 
corrected means of each of the three variables 
) Σ , μ ( ~ ) , , ( ′ N
T
z y x ε ε ε
μ′
y x,  and   based on the noise parameter  z δ : 
) μ
1
, μ
1
, μ
1
( ) μ , μ , μ ( μ
2
1
2
1
2
1 T
z y x z y x d
d
d
d
d
d − − −
= ′ ′ ′ = ′ . The matrix   is the original covariance 
matrix. For each separate variable, calculate the linear combination of the original variable and the 
random noise as previously described. For example, for record i: 
Σ
zi i i d z d z ε × + × = ′ 2 1 . The mean 
vector and the covariance matrix remain the same before and after the perturbation, and the additivity is 
exactly preserved. 
 
3.2     Micro-aggregation 
Micro-aggregation is another SDL technique for continuous variables (see Defays and Nanopoulos, 
1992, Anwar 1993, Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz, 2002 and references therein). Records are 
grouped together in small groupings of size p. For each individual in a group k, the value of the 
variable is replaced with the group average. This method can be carried out for both a univariate or 
multivariate setting where the latter can be implemented through sophisticated computer algorithms. 
Replacing values of variables with their average in a small group will not generally initiate 
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at the boundaries of such edits. When carrying out micro-aggregation simultaneously on several 
variables within a group, additivity constraints  will also be preserved since the sum of the means of 
two variables will equal the mean of the total variable in a grouping. The focus therefore for 
minimizing information loss is on the preservation of variances.  
 
Micro-aggregation preserves the mean (and the overall total) of a variable z but will lead to a decrease 
in the variance. This is because the total variance can be decomposed into a “within” group variance 
and a “between” group variance. When implementing micro-aggregation and replacing values by the 
average of their group, only the “between” variance remains. In practice, there may be little decrease in 
the variance since the size of the groups  is small.  In order to minimize information loss due to a 
decrease in the variance, random noise can be generated  according to the magnitude of the difference 
between the total variance and the “between” variance, and added to the micro-aggregated variable. 
Besides raising the variance back to its original level, this method will also result in extra protection 
against the risk of re-identification since micro-aggregation in some cases can easily be deciphered (see 
Winkler, 2002). The combination of micro-aggregation and additive random noise is discussed in 
Oganian and Karr, 2006. When adding random noise to several micro-aggregated variables 
simultaneously that are connected through an additivity constraint, a linear programming technique can 
be applied to preserve the additivity.    
 
3.3    Unbiased Random Rounding  
 
Rounding to a predefined base is a form of adding noise, although in this case the exact value of the 
noise is known a priori and is controlled via the rounding base. As in micro-aggregation, it is unlikely 
that inconsistencies will result when rounding the data. However, rounding continuous variables 
separately may cause additivity edit failures since the sum of rounded variables will not necessarily 
equal their rounded total. In addition, summing rounded values will not equal their rounded total and 
large discrepancies can occur.  
 
Fellegi (1975) proposed a technique for implementing unbiased random rounding on a  one-
dimensional table that preserves the overall total (and hence the mean) of the variable being rounded. 
The technique can be carried out as follows: Let m be the value to be rounded and let   be 
the largest multiple k of the base b such that 
) (m Floor
m bk < . In addition, define the residual of m according to 
the rounding base b by  . For an unbiased random rounding procedure, m is 
rounded up to   with probability 
) ( ) ( m Floor m m res − =
) ) ( ( b m Floor + b m res ) (  and rounded down to   with 
probability 
) (m Floor
) ) ( 1 ( b m res − . If m is already a multiple of b, it remains unchanged. The expected value 
of the rounded value is the original value. The rounding is usually implemented “with replacement” in 
the sense that each value is rounded independently, i.e. a random uniform number u between 0 and 1 is 
generated for each value. If  b m res u ) ( <  then the entry is rounded up, otherwise it is rounded 
down. In order to preserve the exact total of the variable being rounded, a ‘without replacement’ 
strategy can be used for selecting values to round up: for entries having  , randomly select a 
fraction of 
) (m res
b m res ) (  of the values and round upwards, the rest of the values round downwards. 
Repeat this process for all  . Similar to the case of simple random sampling with and without 
replacement, this selection strategy reduces the additional variance caused by the rounding. 
) (m res
 
The rounding procedure should be carried out within sub-groups in order to benchmark important 
totals. This may, however, distort the overall total across the entire dataset. Users are typically more 
interested in smaller sub-groups for analysis and therefore preserving totals for sub-groups is generally 
more desirable than the overall total. Reshuffling algorithms can be applied for changing the direction 
of the rounding for some of the values across the records in order to preserve additivity constraints  and 
overall totals.   
 
 
 
  8 4.  Information Loss Measures 
The utility of microdata that has undergone SDL methods is based on whether statistical inference can 
be carried out  and the same analysis and conclusions drawn on the perturbed data compared to the 
original data. This depends on user requirements and the types of analysis. In general, microdata is 
multi-purposed and used by many different users. Therefore,   proxy measures have been developed 
that  assess the utility based on measuring distortions to distributions and the impact on bias, variance 
and other statistical analysis tools (Chi-squared statistic, R
2 goodness of fit, rankings, etc.). Domingo-
Ferrer, Mateo-Sanz and Torra, 2001, Gomatam and Karr, 2003, Shlomo and Young, 2006 and Shlomo  
2007 describe the use of such measures for assessing information loss in  perturbed statistical data. A 
brief summary of some useful proxy measures are the following: 
 
4.1   Distance Metrics   
 
Distance metrics are used to measure distortions to distributions in the microdata as a result of applying 
SDL methods.  Some useful metrics for aggregated data are presented in Gomatam and Karr, 2003.  
The AAD is a  distance metric  based on the average absolute difference per cell in the distribution. Let 
D   represent a frequency distribution produced from the microdata and let     be the   frequency 
in cell c.  The  Average Absolute Distance per Cell is defined as:  
) (c D
                                                                  (12)    
 where   is the number of cells in the distribution.   
c
c
orig pert pert orig n c D c D D D AAD / | ) ( ) ( | ) , ( ∑ − =
c n
.     
4.2  Impact on Measures of Association 
 
Tests for independence are often carried out on joint frequency distributions between categorical 
variables that span a table calculated from the microdata. The test for independence for a two-way table 
is based on a Pearson Chi-Squared Statistic  ∑∑
−
=
ij ij
ij ij
e
e o
2
2 ) (
χ  where   is the observed 
count and 
ij o
n n n e j i ij / ) ( . . × =  is the expected count for row i and column j. If the row and column are 
independent then     has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with (R-1)(C-1)and for large values 
the test rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis of association. Typically, the 
Cramer’s V is used which is a measure of association between two categorical variables:     
2 χ
) 1 ( ), 1 min(
/
2
− −
=
C R
n
CV
χ
 . The information loss measure is the  percent relative difference 
between the original and perturbed table: 
          
) (
) ( ) (
100 ) , (
orig
orig pert
orig pert D CV
D CV D CV
D D RCV
−
× =                                                  (13) 
For multiple dimensions, log-linear modeling is often used to examine associations. A similar  measure 
to (13) can be calculated by taking the relative difference in the Deviance obtained from the model 
based on the  original and perturbed microdata.  
 
4.3  Impact on a Regression Analysis 
 
For continuous variables, it is useful to assess the impact on the correlation and in particular the  
2 R  of 
a regression (or ANOVA) analysis. For example, in an ANOVA, the test involves whether a 
continuous dependent variable has the same means across groups defined by a categorical explanatory 
variable. The goodness of fit criterion 
2 R  is based on a decomposition of the variance of the mean of 
the dependent variable. By perturbing the statistical data, the groupings may lose their homogeneity, 
the “between” variance becomes smaller, and the “within” variance becomes larger. In other words, the 
proportions within each of the groupings shrink towards the overall mean. On the other hand, the 
“between” variance may become artificially larger showing more association than in the original 
distribution.   
  9 
The information loss is based on assessing differences in the means across categories of an explanatory 
variable.   Let    k x  be the mean in category k and define the ‘between’  variance of this mean by: 
∑ −
−
=
k
k orig x x
k
x BV
2 ) (
1 | |
1
) (  where   x  is the overall mean in the sample and   is the 
number of categories of the explanatory variable.  Information loss is measured by:    
| | k
      
) (
) ( ) (
100 ) , (
orig
orig pert
orig pert x BV
x BV x BV
x x BVR
−
× =                                                            (14) 
In addition, another analysis of information loss involves comparing coefficient estimates based on 
applying a regression model on both the original and perturbed microdata.  
 
5.  Example 
We present an example of how a Statistical Agency might assess disclosure limitation strategies 
through a disclosure risk-data utility analysis.  We use the  1995 Israel 20% Census  sample composed 
of  N=753,711 individuals aged 15 and over living in households in Israel at the time of the Census. 
This large sample serves as a ‘population’ from which we draw samples. Since the population is 
known, we can investigate the properties of sample-based methods and verify results. We draw simple 
random samples of individuals with a sampling fraction of   100 / 1 = π  ( n=7,537). The key variables 
in the microdata are the following: 
 
Locality Code (single codes for large localities above 10,000 inhabitants and single combined code  for 
smaller localities)  – 85 categories; Sex – 2 categories; Age groups -  15 categories; Occupation -11 
categories, Income groups -  17 categories (K=476,850). 
 
In addition, we focus on one sensitive variable in the microdata:  income from earnings.  
 
The Statistical Agency needs to assess disclosure risk of the sample microdata and considers SDL 
methods. Since disclosure risk is defined as the risk of identification based on the categorical key 
variables, we consider two  SDL methods which reduce  the risk by masking the Locality Code:  
•  Recoding and collapsing categories of the Locality Code (from 85 to 30 categories), 
•  PRAM on the large Locality Codes with 0.70 on the diagonal of the misclassification matrix. We 
implement an invariant PRAM to preserve expected marginal frequencies of the Locality Codes. 
.   
After applying  SDL methods, the disclosure risk needs to be reassessed and compared to tolerable risk 
thresholds set by the MRP at the Statistical Agency.  In addition, information loss measures need to be 
calculated in order to compare and  understand the impact of the methods on statistical inference.  In 
this example we use: 
•  AAD calculated by differencing the marginal frequencies of the original Locality Codes to the 
perturbed Locality Codes. For the recoded collapsed Locality Codes, we imputed  the average 
frequency, for example, if 10 localities were recoded into a single code, each locality would 
receive 1/10 of the total, 
•  RCV on a table defined by original and collapsed or perturbed  Locality Code and Occupation,  
•  BVR where the dependent variable is average income and the independent variable the original and 
collapsed or perturbed Locality Code.  
 
Table 1 presents a comparison of these two SDL methods with respect to disclosure risk and data 
utility. The ‘true’ risk measure based on  ∑ = =
k
k k F f I / 1 ) 1 ( 2 τ  is given in the column headings in 
parenthesis. The ‘true’ disclosure risk for PRAM is calculated by summing  across sample 
uniques that were not perturbed. The estimates 
k F / 1
2 ˆ τ  in Table 1 are similar to the true values. The 
asymptotically normal test statistic based on (5) is given in parenthesis. Note that to estimate the 
disclosure risk for PRAM we used the formula in (11).  
 
As can be seen in Table 1, recoding and collapsing Locality Code causes more information loss   
compared to PRAM, even with 30% of the Locality Codes perturbed.  The AAD had an average 
  10difference of 7.2 per code   for the recoded Locality Codes while PRAM had  an average difference of 
3.9 per code. This result is not surprising since we used the invariance property for PRAM which 
preserves expected marginal frequencies. The other information loss measures based on the original 
Locality Codes compared to the recoded or perturbed Locality Codes  were significantly worse under 
the method of recoding. Note that both methods give negative values for RCV and BVR which reflect a 
loss of association and more heterogeneity as a result of  the SDL techniques.  The disclosure risk 
however is more effectively reduced with recoding than with PRAM. The MRP might consider 
reducing the disclosure risk further by combining the SDL methods, for example, by identifying those 
records that remain unique after the recoding and subsequently implementing PRAM on the high-risk 
records only. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of SDL techniques: Recoding and PRAM 
 Original   
Locality Codes 
 
 
 
( = 2 τ 1,025.7) 
Recoded locality 
Codes  
(30 categories)  
 
 
( = 2 τ 571.5) 
PRAM on 
localities 
(85 categories 
with 70% 
perturbation) 
( = 2 τ 714.7) 
Disclosure Risk 
     
  2 ˆ τ          (test statistic) 
  Sample uniques 
 
SU / ˆ2 τ   
n / ˆ2 τ  
1015.5  (1.94) 
4,005 
25.3% 
13.5% 
599.9   (1.32) 
3,376 
17.8% 
8.0% 
729.5  (1.42) 
3,479 
20.9% 
9.7% 
Utility 
AAD  across 85 localities with mean 
imputation for recoded cells 
0 7.22  3.88 
RCV for localities×occupation (11)     
(true=0.1370) 
0 -32.7%  -7.5% 
BVR for average income between 
localities   (true=3.082*10 ) 
9
0 -44.4%  -8.9% 
  
After protecting  key variables, Statistical Agencies might consider taking further action by perturbing 
sensitive variables, such as income. In our example, income was also used as a key variable so 
disclosure risk would need to be reassessed if perturbation is carried out on the income variable. We 
carried out three basic techniques for perturbing income from earnings for those records with non-zero 
income (3,249 out of the 7,537 individuals in the sample): correlated and uncorrelated additive noise, 
controlled and uncontrolled random rounding to base 100 and micro-aggregation (size of groups=10) 
with and without additive noise.  Results across 50 simulated samples are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 shows that adding noise to the variables causes the greatest average absolute distance between 
original and perturbed cells of income groups which is also reflected in the high percentages of records 
that are switching income groups. There is not much difference between controlled and uncontrolled 
rounding to base 100 because of the large sample size (3,729 individuals with non-zero income) and 
hence carrying out a with or without replacement strategy for selecting values to round  provides the 
same results. The percent difference in the variance as well as the BVR have negative numbers for the 
microaggregation showing a decrease in the overall and between variance of  average income. Adding 
noise to the microaggregated variable should have corrected the variance but this seems to have an 
adverse effect on the BVR.  Adding correlated noise also improved the variance and the BVR of average 
income although it introduced more association between the income groups and occupations resulting 
in  a higher RCV.  Rounding and microaggregation also increased the association.  Overall, while the 
frequencies of the income groups may have changed significantly, the impact on statistical  inference is 
minimal.  
 
 
 
  11 
Table 2: Information loss measures for income from wages after perturbation for individuals 
with non-zero income 
 Additive  Noise 
  
Rounding to Base 100 
  
Microaggregation 
  
  Uncorrelated Correlated Uncontrolled  Controlled Without 
noise 
With 
noise 
AAD across 16 income 
groups   
27.8  24.8  5.9 5.9 4.8  20.8 
Percent Difference in 
Variance 
7.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  -1.5%  -0.7% 
RCV for income 
groups(16)× 
occupation (11) 
(true=0.1736) 
0.2% 1.9%  0.9% 0.7% 1.0%  1.5% 
BVR average income 
between localities (85)  
(true=3.082*10 ) 
9
1.0%   0.0%  0.0%  0.1% -0.9%  -1.4% 
Percentage of records  
switching income 
groups 
26.6% 17.4%  5.0%  5.1%    1.8%  13.9% 
 
 
 
 
6.  Discussion 
In this paper, we focus on how a Statistical Agency might carry out a disclosure risk-data utility 
analysis to inform decisions about the release of sample microdata. The main conclusions of the paper 
are: (1) the need for a reliable method for objectively assessing disclosure risk; (2) SDL methods 
should be optimized and combined to ensure utility in the perturbed microdata.  
 
Statistical Agencies generally release same sets of microdata on a yearly basis but the disclosure risk-
data utility analysis need not be repeated every year if no significant changes are applied to the 
microdata. Therefore, it is recommended that time and resources be spent at least once on an in-depth 
analysis for ensuring high quality microdata with tolerable risk thresholds for each mode of access.  
 
Distributing different sets of the same microdata may be a cause for concern since different versions of 
the microdata can be linked and the original data disclosed. MRPs must ensure strict licensing rules and 
guidelines to ensure that this does not occur. In the future, it is likely that microdata will be distributed 
via remote access and Statistical Agencies will have more control of who receives the microdata.  
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